This paper presents a potential-game approach for distributed cooperative selection of informative sensors, when the goal is to maximize the mutual information between the measurement variables and the quantities of interest. It is proved that a local utility function defined by the conditional mutual information of an agent conditioned on the other agents' sensing decisions leads to a potential game, with the global potential being the original mutual information of the cooperative planning problem. The joint strategy fictitious play method is then applied to obtain a distributed solution that provably converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Two illustrative numerical examples are presented to demonstrate good convergence and performance properties of the proposed game-theoretic method.
I. INTRODUCTION
M UTUAL information has recently been adopted as a metric of information gain in many contexts (e.g., cooperative sensing for tracking targets [1] , [2] , weather forecast improvement with mobile sensor networks [3] - [5] , temperature field prediction described by a Gaussian process [6] , management of deployed sensor networks [7] , [8] , and adaptive data reduction for simultaneous localization and mapping of mobile robots [9] ). This popularity results in part from the fact that mutual information is a more fundamental quantity of information (than entropy) [10] that can be applied to general random entities (i.e., random variables, random processes, random functions, and random systems), and in part from the fact that often times sufficient statistics (rather than the actual data) can be used to compute the mutual information. In addition, recent progress on efficient Bayesian inference methods has contributed to effective quantification of mutual information in various contexts [11] - [16] .
However, compared with the variety and maturity of the concept of maximizing mutual information for decision making of a network of sensing agents, distributed implementation of such a process has not been fully studied and investigated. This may be rather surprising in that earlier works, such as [1] , already addressed distributed/decentralized decision making of this cooperative sensing problem by presenting a local greedy framework, in which each agent maximizes the mutual information for its own measurement choice. Hoffman and Tomlin [2] extended this local greedy framework and analyzed the optimality gap for such a localized decision making to prove that the optimality is monotonically improved as more agents make decisions in a coordinated manner (in their problem setting where submodularity holds). The first author compared the local greedy and a sequential greedy architecture in the context of targeting of weather sensors and pointed out that interteam information sharing is crucial for performance improvement [4] .
This set of previous research provided useful insights and also implementable algorithms; however, the fundamental question of decentralizing the planning process for cooperative sensor networks has not been fully resolved. Limited progress in distributed informative planning may be juxtaposed with mature development of decentralized/distributed task allocation algorithms [17] - [22] . One primary reason for this limit is the underlying correlation structure of the information space in which the cooperative decision is made. For task allocation, for example, one agent's decentralized decision may change the feasibility/fitness of the other agents for that particular task of interest, but there is typically no change in the score structure for other tasks. However, in cooperative sensing, one agent's decision makes an impact on all other agents' reward structures-for example, if agent 1 selects some task A, then task B that was best for agent 2 may no longer be the best and task C all of a sudden could become the best. It is hard to embed this kind of correlation structure in decentralized decision making. Given this fundamental challenge, this paper tries to take a little bit different approach for distributed decision making for cooperative planning of sensor networks. The authors point out that the proposed structure is not fully decentralized in the sense that it relies on agents' sharing of the prior correlation structure with sufficient accuracy and agents' ability to access other agents' decisions-thus, it is more of a distributed decision making rather than a decentralized decision making.
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to addressing distributed decision making for informative sensor planning. The mutual information is adopted as a reward metric to represent informativeness of a sensing choice. For the global optimization problem of maximizing the mutual informa-tion between the measurement selection and the quantities of interest, a potential-game formulation that defines local utility functions aligned with the global objective function is proposed. The conditional mutual information of the measurement selection conditioned on the other agents' action enables the potential-game formulation, which allows for taking advantage of a learning algorithm in the optimization process. The joint strategy fictitious play (JSFP) is particularly considered as an efficient learning framework. Numerical case studies on idealized weather forecasting and range-only cooperative target tracking using unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) are presented to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the proposed framework. Preliminary work was presented in [23] , while this paper includes an additional case study that addresses non-Gaussianity in the problem formulation and locality in the prior information, as well as a much more refined description of the algorithm and the proofs.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Mutual Information
Mutual information represents the amount of information contained in one random entity (X) about the other random entity (V ). If the two entities of interest are random vectors, the mutual information can be represented as the difference between the prior and the posterior entropy of V conditioned on X
being the probability density function of a continuous random vector V (or the probability mass function for a discrete random vector). The mutual information is known to be commutative (or measure independent [24] )
When X consists of multiple other random entities, i.e., X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k , . . . , X n }, each of X k being a random variable and/or a random vector with smaller cardinality, by the chain rule the mutual information, can be expressed as
for arbitrary index permutation {k 1 , . . . , k n } obtained from {1, . . . , n}, where X k 1:i−1 = {X k 1 , . . . , X k i−1 }.
B. Potential Games
Consider a finite game of n players defined by each player's an action set A i and a utility function U i : A → R with A = × n i=1 A i . The notation a −i is often used to denote the profile of player actions other than player i , i.e., a −i = {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n }.
Definition 1 (Potential Games [25] ): A finite n-player game with action sets {A i } n i=1 and utility functions
for every a −i ∈ × j =i A j and for every a i , a i ∈ A i . Definition 2 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium [26] ): An action profile a ∈ A is called a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if
1) Joint Strategy Fictitious Play [25] : As a mechanics to solve a repeated game, this paper adopts the JSFP developed in [25] . This section briefs on the basic concept of JSFP; thus, notations and descriptions are similar to what was written in the original article. JSFP is a sequential decision making process in a repeated game, i.e., the same set of games being played over and over again, but with updated set of information at every stage. In JSFP, each player keeps track of the empirical frequencies of the joint actions of all others. In contrast to the traditional fictitious play [26] , the action of player i at stage t is based on the presumption that other players play randomly but jointly according to the joint empirical frequencies. Let f −i (a −i ; t) be the frequency with which all players but i have selected some joint action profile a −i up to stage t − 1
where I(·) is the indicator function that is unity if the argument is true. In JSFP, player i 's action at stage t is based on the expected utility for action a i ∈ A i , with the joint action model of opponents given by
where the expectation is calculated by the empirical frequency distribution f −i (t) that defines f −i (a −i ; t) for all a −i . It was pointed out in [25] that the predicted utilities U i (a i ; f −i (t)) for each a i ∈ A i can be expressed as
which is the average utility player i would have obtained if he/she had chosen a i rather than what he/she actually chose at every stage up to time t − 1 while other players playing the same. This leads to a recursion [25] 
which provides significant computational advantage of JSFP compared with the traditional fictitious play based on empirical frequencies of marginal actions. Although convergence of JSFP to a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed even for a potential game, a slight modification of JSFP to include some notion of inertia was proven to converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [25, Th. 2.1]. III. COOPERATIVE SENSOR NETWORK PLANNING FOR MAXIMUM INFORMATION Consider a network of N sensing agents 1 deployed in a relatively large domain (see Fig. 1 ). Each sensing agent is designated to a certain sensing region within which the agent can select points of sensing; agent i 's sensing region is denoted by S i and is assumed to be finite dimensional.
Sensing agent i determines a set of sensing points s i = {s i 1 , s i 2 , . . . , s i n i } ⊂ S i with n i = |s i |. If an agent takes measurement with some sensing option s, the measurement model is given by
where W s is some additive sensing noise and h s (·) is the observation function that typically is a function of the sensing location s. For example, if the agent measures some physical quantity (e.g., temperature and pressure) at the measurement location, h s (X) = X s with X s being the physical entity of interest at s; if the agent observes bearing or range to the object of interest from the sensing location s, h s can be expressed as a function of relative geometry of s and the object location.
The goal of cooperative sensor network planning is to reduce uncertainty in some random quantity of interest called verification variables and denoted by V . In this paper, the mutual information is used to quantify the uncertainty reduction of V due to measurement selection by the sensing agents. The mathematical formulation of the cooperative sensor planning is given by the optimization
which maximizes mutual information between the verification variables and the measurement chosen by the sensing agents. The verification variable V is some subset of the state variables X but is not necessarily part of the states associated with some sensing region. It can be state variables associated with a separate region of interest or it can be the whole state variables depending on the context. The optimization (P) may be subject to some constraints such as a cardinality constraint in each agent's measurement selection, i.e., |s i | = n i .
If there exists a central agent (or computational unit) that can decide on all the agents' sensing decision, (P) can simply be considered as a combinatorial optimization problem that considers every admissible measurement option s 1:N and computes the mutual information and then chooses the best solution. This process typically requires huge amount of computational resource; the first author's previous works provided some techniques such as backward selection based on commutativity of mutual information that can reduce the computational cost of the optimization process [3] , [4] .
A. Greedy Approximations
Sometimes a distributed (or decentralized) decision architecture is needed in cooperative planning of sensor networks. One reason is computational complexity. The complexity of (P) easily grows as the number of agents N increases, the number of selected sensing points for each agent n i increases, and/or the size of sensing region |S i | increases. Thus, some level of decomposition and/or approximation is needed to obtain the solution to (P) with maintaining computational tractability. Another reason is the absence of a central unit due to the underlying architecture of the sensor networks. The third possible reason is for better robustness to changes and/or uncertainty in the environment.
From these perspectives, there are a couple of approximation techniques that are often adopted: a local greedy and a sequential greedy decision. For the local greedy strategy, agent i simply trying to maximize the uncertainty reduction of V by the measurement itself selects
This local greedy is known to lead to an arbitrary suboptimal result, because it totally ignores the coupling and correlation between one agent's measurement selection and the other agents' selections. For this reason, the sequential greedy strategy is frequently adopted, in which agents assume some fixed order of information flow, and an agent optimizes its decision based on the preceding agents' decisions max
for some given index permutation {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k N }. This sequential greedy approach has been popular, because it often provides good enough suboptimal solutions. In particular, if the underlying mutual information satisfied submodularity, the sequential greedy strategy provides some worst case performance guarantee: SGA ≥ (1 − 1/e)OPT, where SGA and OPT denote the objective values for the sequential greedy and the optimal solution, respectively [6] . Submodularity, for example, holds when V = X. In addition, unlike the objective function in the local greedy strategy, for sequential greedy strategy, the global reward is summation of the local reward because of the chain rule of mutual information in (1) . Although the sequential greedy strategy provides a relatively good result, it is still subject to some limitations. Choice of index permutation is not systematic, and more importantly, it does not fully take advantage of possible information flows. The strategy solves only one problem for each agent, without considering any possibility of improving the solution performance by communicating agents' decisions. This paper aims at a systematic decision update procedure, inspired by the theory of potential games to achieve closer-to-optimal solution quality.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Cooperative Sensor Network Planning as Potential Game
From a game-theoretic perspective, each sensing agent is considered as a selfish entity who simply tries to maximize its local utility function,
represented is a function of agent i 's sensing decision and the decision of the rest of agents. In order for this N-person game to provide a solution to the cooperative sensing problem in (P), the local utility function should be chosen/designed to align with the objective function I(V ; Z s 1:N ).
Being aligned here means that local player's decision always helps on accomplishing the global objective. The concept of potential game described in Section II-B provides a systematic description of this alignment of the local and global objectives. In other words, if one can devise a potential game in which the global potential function is identical to the objective function of (P), a Nash equilibrium of that potential game can provide a good solution to the cooperative sensor network planning problem.
This section presents one such case as the following Lemma. Lemma 1: With local utility function defined as
the distributed procedure leads to a potential game with global potential
Proof: Consider two different possible sensing actions of agent i , Z s i and Z s i . Then the difference in the local utility function with other agents' actions fixed is given by
which means that the local utility in (4) leads to a potential game aligned with the global potential (5) . Remark 1: Note that once the other agents' actions are fixed at s −i , the utility of agent i depends only on its own action; thus, the maximized solution s i will not be dominated by any unilateral variation of agent i 's action. Hence, if a solution to the potential game in Lemma 1 is found out, that solution is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1: The utility function in Lemma 1 is not the only one that is aligned to the potential function φ in (5) . In general, all the local utility functions of the following form constitute a potential game with the same global potential function:
where J 1 (i ) and J 2 (i ) ⊂ {1, . . . , N} are some index sets satisfying
Proof: For J 1 (i ) and J 2 (i ) satisfying the above-mentioned conditions
The potential function, i.e., the global objective function of the cooperative sensing, can be written as
by the chain rule of mutual information. Thus, for two different actions of agent i , Z s i and Z s i , are defined as
B. Iterative Algorithm With Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
Consider a repeated version of the potential game presented in Lemma 1. In a repeated game, agent i makes its decision at stage t based on the information about the other agents' actions obtained up to stage t − 1. For this repeated game, other agents' current action is not available to agent i ; thus, the utility function for stage t needs only to be defined as its present action and previous history of the other agents' actions.
One possibly implementation of the potential game in Lemma 1 is a one-step look-back scheme in which agent i presumes that the other agents made reasonable decisions at the previous stage and thus maximize local utility conditioned on the other agent's last stage's action
Although looking simple and implementable, this procedure may not converge to a Nash equilibrium, and as will be Algorithm 1 JSFP for Cooperative Sensor Network Planning (Z S 1:N , V ,ᾱ ∈ (0, 1)) demonstrated with numerical examples in Section V, this often leads to agent's cycling between the actions. As briefly described in Section II-B1, the JSFP with inertia proposed in [25] ensures convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in a repeated game version of the potential game. Thus, this paper proposes the application of JSFP (with inertia) to solve the potential game for the cooperative sensing problem. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. Some key points to be noted are as follows.
1) At every stage, each agent computes utility values for all of its possible actions. In lines 3 and 13, function
nchoosek(a, b) indicates a set of b-dimensional vector whose entry is an integer less than or equal to a with all entries being different each other. 2) In line 4, agents' actions are initialized by the solution of local greedy strategy that maximizes mutual information by its own measurement. Note that this initialization step simply provides agents some initial idea about other agents' actions, but does not affect the utility values in the later stages. 3) In line 15, at stage t > 0, utility values for possible actions are calculated recursively. 4) To introduce inertia in the JSFP process, agents choose its best action at the current stage with probabilitȳ α ∈ (0, 1), while keeping the previous action with probability 1 −ᾱ (if statement in line 19).
5) The convergence is checked by the condition in line 25,
which is based on the calculation of two additional types of actions in lines 17 and 18 as well as the actions chosen by the JSFP process. Lemma 2: Suppose that the termination condition in line 25 of Algorithm 1 is satisfied at some finite t. Thus, the following three actions of agent i are identical:
, and s i [t −1] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}; denote this identical action bys i . The following holds fors i , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
1)s i is a converged solution, in the sense that 15) , the same actions i maximizes U i (Z s i ; t) as well. This means that the best response at stage t becomes 
for all s i , which leads to
From (9) 
By the definition of s [t] , which is identical tos ī
which means thats 1:N is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 proves that if the algorithm is terminated by the specified condition, the resulting solution is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is invariant with further stages of game. However, this does not mean that this termination condition is ever satisfied (in finite stages). Fortunately, the original work on the JSFP method ensures convergence of the procedure [25, Th. 2.1]. To adopt this result, the following can be concluded.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 withᾱ ∈ (0, 1) almost surely converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the potential game in Lemma 1, with consistent tie-breaking in all the arg max operations involved in the process.
Proof: The iterative procedure represented as the while loop of Algorithm 1 constitutes a JSFP process with inertia for a potential game, which is proven to converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium almost surely in [25, Th. 2.1]. In addition, Lemma 2 ensures validity of the termination condition of the while loop to stop at a Nash equilibrium. Thus, as a whole, Algorithm 1 produces a Nash equilibrium for the potential game in Lemma 1.
V. NUMERICAL CASE STUDIES
A. Lorenz-95 Sensor Targeting
The proposed JSFP method is demonstrated on a simplified weather sensor targeting example using Lorenz-95 model. The Lorenz-95 model [27] is an idealized chaos model that captures key aspects of weather dynamics, such as energy dissipation, advection, and external forcing. As such, it has been successfully implemented for the initial verification of numerical weather prediction algorithms [27] , [28] . A 2-D extension of the original 1-D model was developed and adopted in [3] and [29] ; this 2-D extension represents the global weather dynamics of the midlatitude region of the northern hemisphere. The dynamics arė
where y i j denotes a scalar meteorological quantity, such as vorticity or temperature [27] , at the (i, j )th grid point; i and j are the longitudinal and latitudinal grid indices, respectively.
There are L on = 36 longitudinal and L at = 9 latitudinal grid points;ȳ = 8 is used for this numerical study. The dynamics are subject to cyclic boundary conditions in the longitudinal direction (y i+L on , j = y i−L on , j = y i, j ) and to the constant advection condition (y i,0 = y i,−1 = y i,L at +1 = 4 in advection terms) in the latitudinal direction, to model the midlatitude area as an annulus. A similar sensor targeting scenario as [3] is considered. The problem is to choose optimal sensing locations at time t S = 0.05 (equivalent to 6 h in wall clock) to reduce the uncertainty in the verification regions at t V = 0.55 (equivalent to 66 h). While a routine network of sensors of size 93 is already deployed and takes measurement every 6 h, the decision is to choose additional sensing locations for UAV sensor platforms. The routine network is distributed unevenly to represent data void over the oceanic region. An ensemble square-root filter [30] with 1024 samples is used to obtain the correlation structure of the search regions and the verification region. This ensemble is forward integrated to obtain the prior ensemble at the verification time; then the problem can be treated as a static sensor selection problem involving the measurement variables at t S and the verification variables at t V . The prior data available from this ensemble forecast preprocessing is the Monte Carlo samples for X S 1:N ∪ V , or equivalently the covariance matrix for these variables. The backward selection scheme [3] that takes advantage of commutativity of mutual information is utilized to calculate the mutual information
where the measurement equation is given by Z s = X s + W s with W s ∼ N (0, R s ) for all s ∈ S 1:N . For the given covariance Cov(X S 1:N ∪ V ), the backward scheme first computes the conditional covariance Cov(X S 1:N |V ). Once this conditional covariance is computed, then the selection process for each sensing agent is the selection of corresponding principal submatrix and calculation of determinants. The proposed JSFP-based method is tested for three different sensing topologies-six sensors in a row, six sensors in 2 × 3 format, and nine sensors in 3 × 3 format with equal coverage. An oceanic region of size 12 × 9 (in longitude × latitude) is considered as a potential search region, among which agents are assigned their sensing region S i . The goal of cooperative sensing is to reduce uncertainty over a separate verification region at time t V ; the verification region is not a subset of the search region. The number of sensing points each agent selects, n i , is set to be one for all the cases, the main reason being the optimal solution cannot be obtained in tractable time for larger cases. For comparison, seven different strategies are considered. 1) Optimal: An optimal solution for the cooperative sensing problem in (P) is computed by explicit enumeration. 2) Local Greedy: A noniterative strategy that maximizes the mutual information of its own measurement calculated; the solution of the local greedy gives the initial condition to iterative algorithms, as in (2). 3) Sequential Greedy: A sequential algorithm in which an agent selects the point that gives the largest mutual information conditioned on the preceding agents' decision, as in (3), with prespecified agent indexing. 4) Iterative Greedy: An iterative process that only depends on the latest game outcome, as in (6). 5) Round-Robin Greedy: An iterative process similar to iterative greedy but with incorporating decision of preceding agents (in fixed agent indexing) at the current stage, i.e., max I(Z s i |Z s 1:i−1 [t], Z s i+1:N [t − 1]). 6) JSFP Without Inertia: The implementation of Algorithm 1 withᾱ = 1.0. 7) JSFP Without Inertia: Implementation of Algorithm 1 withᾱ = 0.3. The resulting histories of objective values in the iterative procedure are shown in Fig. 2 . Although the three cases herein might not be diverse enough to make concrete statements about the characteristics of the algorithms, some trends can be observed in this case study.
1) The JSFP converges to a solution that is same as or close to the optimal solution; the convergence time is less than 20 iterations. 2) The JSFP solution produces a better solution than the sequential greedy in terms of optimality gap. 3) Iterative greedy cycles in all the presented cases. It is also observed that the round-robin greedy scheme generates a good converged solution for this case study; however, this may not mean that this scheme works well in general as will be found out in Section V-B. In addition, the inertia parameterᾱ does not seem to make a significant impact on the solution convergence in this example; however, as commented in [25] , the convergence of the JSFP without inertia is not guaranteed in general.
B. Range-Only Tracking With UAV Sensors
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed JSFP method in a non-Gaussian setting, cooperative localization of a stationary target with range-only sensors equipped on quadrotor UAVs is considered. The same example was introduced in [2] , which presented particle-filter-based computation of mutual information (and its local approximation); this paper takes advantage of this particle-filter-based framework in computation of associated mutual information.
A network of quadrotor sensor platforms tries to estimate the location of a stationary target. The location of quadrotor i , denoted by s i , is represented as the following discrete-time dynamics:
where a i (k) ∈ A i is the control input, which represents movement to one of the 12 candidate directions, {0 • , 45 • , 90 • , . . . , 315 • } with some constant speed. Each UAV takes measurement of the distance between itself and the target with some noise
where r represents the position vector of the target and W i (k) is the additive sensing noise that is not necessarily Gaussian. To effectively consider the nonlinearity and non-Gaussianity in the observation process, particle filtering is used to estimate the target state. The particle filter approximates the distribution of the target states with a total of M particles of [V ( p) , w ( p) ], where V ( p) and w ( p) represent the states and the importance weight of the pth particle. Each agent carries its own particle filter to estimate the target state and utilizes this own filter to make their plans for sensing, while measurements and sensor locations are assumed to be shared by communication among sensors. In this sense, this case study somehow handles a case where perfect sharing of prior information is not achieved.
At every time step, the sensor network determines best sensing locations to minimize the uncertainty in the target location when the estimate on the target location based on the measurement thus far is available; thus, the problem at time step k can be formulated as the following mutual information maximization:
where the verification variable V = r and Z (k−1) s 1:N {Z s 1:N (l)|l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}}. Once the UAV sensors move to the planned sensing locations and take measurements of ranges to the target, these measurements are incorporated into the particle filters of each sensor. The updated particle filter provides prior information for the planning decision at the next time step.
For the global objective in (11) , the local utility function for the proposed potential game can be defined as
Note that this mutual information can alternatively be represented as
by the commutativity mutual information and the conditional independence of the measurements conditioned on the target state [31] . This reformulation is particularly convenient since the last term H(Z s i (k)|V ) represents simply the uncertainty in the measurement noise.
In the particle-filtering framework, the computation of the entropy terms in (12) can be performed using the Monte Carlo integration and an appropriate numerical quadrature technique, as described in detail in [2] . The entropy of some measurement Z s (conditioned on the prior information) can be expressed as
where superscript ( p) denotes the particle index, the conditional entropy of sensor i 's measurement, and Z s i conditioned on other sensors' measurements can be computed from
The conditional entropy of measurement conditioned on the target state can be obtained by
It should be noted that this last term does not have any impact on the planning solution unless the distribution of sensing noise varies with the sensing location. The scenario is to estimate the position of a target in a 40 m × 40 m square region with three UAVs initially positioning at the same location; there is no prior information about the target and particles are uniformly drawn over the whole square region. Fig. 3 shows the resulting trajectories of the sensor network when using the proposed JSFP method (with α = 0.3) compared with the local greedy and the sequential greedy strategies. For all three cases, plans are made every time step and the sensors move to the planned positions to take measurements and make decisions for the next time step. The trajectories are overlaid with the particles of the target state carried by the first agent. Observe the difference in the initial direction of UAVs for the three strategies. Since the rangeonly sensor lacks directional information and all the mobile sensors are initially placed at the same position, the probability distribution of the target location with the measurements taken at the initial time looks like a circle around the UAVs' initial position. Since every direction is equally uncertain, physical insights suggest that the optimal cooperative behavior of the sensor network is to spread out with equal angular distance (i.e., 120 • ) to lower down the overall uncertainty level. This type of behavior is observed for the JSFP solution. For the sequential greedy case, it can be seen that two agents who make the first two decisions move to the opposite direction, which is the best way for the two-agent problem. For the local greedy case, agents do not coordinate and move to a similar direction, which is highly suboptimal.
In addition, the performance of the JSFP method is further investigated as follows. Each agent moves in a randomly chosen direction and takes measurement; however, every time step the planning problem is posed and the solutions for eight different strategies are computed: 1) optimal; 2) local greedy; 3) sequential greedy; 4) iterative greedy with pairwise approximation of mutual information [2] ; 5) round-robin greedy with pairwise approximation; 6) iterative greedy with potential game utility; 7) round-robin greedy with potential game utility; and 8) JSFP withᾱ = 0.3. In pairwise approximation [for strategy 4) and 5)], agent i tries to the utility function is defined as U pw i (Z s i ) = I(V ; Z s i ) + j =i I(V ; Z s j |Z s i ), which is an upperbound of the global objective function for this particular case where the mutual information is submodular. Similar to the Lorenz example in Section V-A, for the iterative greedy scheme, an agent maximizes a utility based on the other agents' decision at the latest stage, while for the round-robin implementation, the preceding agents' decisions at the current stage are incorporated with fixed indexing. Fig. 4 shows the optimality gaps of the strategies for every time step; in case an algorithm does not converge, the objective value at a prespecified final stage is plotted. Observe that the JSFP produces solutions very close to the optimum in every case, while the other methods result in large optimality gap for some cases. The round-robin implementation of the correct mutual information metric appears to work well, but Fig. 4 (right) depicts the convergence history for some particular time step shows that the method is not convergent. The JSFP procedure converges within 5.7 stages on average, and average of 7.1 calculations of mutual information are involved until convergence-note that the latter is less than three times of the former as an agent computes mutual information values only when the other agents change their decisions. This number of calculations is certainly more expensive than for the noniterative greedy strategies, but is much less than exhaustive search for the optimal solution in which hundreds of calculations are required.
VI. CONCLUSION
A potential game-based approach for distributed selection of informative sensors has been presented when the global information reward is defined as the mutual information between the measurement variables and the entities of interest. A local utility function defined that leads to a potential game is proposed, and the JSFP method is then applied to obtain a Nash equilibrium of the potential game. Two numerical examples have demonstrated the validity of the proposed method compared with other distributed schemes.
